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Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) can im-
prove the spectral efficiency by exploiting the power domain and
successive interference cancellation (SIC), and it can be applied
to various transmission schemes including random access that
plays a crucial role in the Internet of Things (IoT) to support
connectivity for a number of devices with sparse activity. In
this paper, we formulate a game when NOMA is applied to
ALOHA to decide the transmission probability. We consider a
payoff function based on an energy-efficiency metric and drive
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (NE).
Index Terms—random access, non-orthogonal multiple ac-
cess, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is to exploit the
power domain and allows multiple users to share the same
radio resource. As in [1], successive interference cancellation
(SIC) can be employed in NOMA to effectively decode signals
in the presence of interference. Since NOMA can improve the
spectral efficiency of multiuser systems, it has been widely
investigated to and considered for 5th generation (5G) systems
[2]–[5].
For downlink NOMA, superposition coding and SIC are
employed, where the power allocation becomes crucial to guar-
antee successful decoding with SIC. Beamforming with user
clustering is considered in [6], the sum rate optimization is
investigated with a minorization-maximization method in [7],
and a generalized NOMA beamforming approach is studied in
[8] in order to take into account the spatial correlation.
NOMA can also be employed for uplink transmissions. For
uplink NOMA, the power allocation to guarantee successful
SIC is studied in [9]. In [10], [11], NOMA is applied to
ALOHA, which is a random access scheme [12], with different
power levels. With NOMA, since more (virtual) channels can
be available, the throughput of ALOHA can be improved,
which implies that NOMA-ALOHA can support more users
or devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) with a limited
bandwidth.
In general, random access schemes are suitable for a num-
ber of users or nodes with sparse active as signaling overhead
to allocate radio resources is not required. Thus, random
access is considered for machine-type communications (MTC)
in [13], and employed for standards as in [14], [15]. While
signaling overhead is low in random access, each node or user
has to decide its transmission parameters. In [16]–[18], it is
shown that the notion of game theory [19] becomes useful to
locally optimize transmission parameters for random access
schemes, since random access can be seen as a noncooperative
game.
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic approach for
NOMA-ALOHA proposed in [10] to decide the transmission
probability or the mixed strategy for transmissions. In particu-
lar, we formulate a NOMA-ALOHA game based on an energy-
efficiency metric for the payoff function and derive the mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) for each user’s transmission
or access probability.
Notation: Matrices and vectors are denoted by upper- and
lower-case boldface letters, respectively. The superscript T
denotes the transpose. E[·] denotes the statistical expectation.
II. SINGLE-CHANNEL TWO-PERSON GAME
In this section, we consider NOMA-ALOHA with single
channel in order to demonstrate how a game-theoretic ap-
proach can be employed to decide transmission probabilities.
A. Two-Person NOMA-ALOHA Game
Suppose that there are two users1 for multiple access (or
uplink transmissions) with a single channel and a receiver or
base station (BS). We assume that NOMA is employed with
two different power levels. Thus, the number of transmission
strategies for each user is 3 as follows:
Sk = S = {H,L, 0}, k = 1, 2,
where the subscript k is the index for users, H and L
represent the high and low transmit powers, respectively, and
0 represents no transmission. Denote by sk the strategy of user
k. In addition, s−k represents the set of the strategies of the
users except user k, i.e., s−k = {s1, . . . , sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sK},
if there are K users. For two-person games, s−1 = s2 and
s−2 = s1.
The payoff function of user k is given by
uk(sk, s−k) = u(sk, s−k)
= R(sk, s−k)− C(sk), k = 1, 2, (1)
where R(s, s′) is the reward function of successful transmis-
sion and C(s) is the cost function of transmission strategy. In
particular, we consider the following reward function:
R(s, s′) =
{
W, if s 6= s′ and s ∈ {H,L}
0, o.w.,
(2)
1Throughout the paper, we assume that users and players are interchange-
able.
where W > 0 is the reward of successful transmission for a
user. Due to NOMA, if the user of interest chooses s = H ,
while the other user chooses s′ = L or 0, the user of interest
can successfully transmit his signal. Thus, the main difference
of NOMA-ALOHA from conventional ALOHA is that the BS
is able to recover the signals from two users simultaneously
as long as one user employs strategy H and the other user
adopts strategy L as in (2). Note that in (2), as in conventional
ALOHA, if two users choose (H,H) or (L,L), we assume
collision and the BS is not able to receive any signal [12].
For the cost function, we can consider the following
assignment as an example:
C(H) = 2, C(L) = 1, and C(0) = 0,
because strategy H requires a higher transmit power than
strategy L.
It is noteworthy that the payoff function in (1) can be
seen as an energy-efficiency metric, which is widely used in
wireless systems, e.g., [20] for power control game. To see that
the payoff function in (1) is an energy-efficiency metric, we
can consider the logarithm of the ratio of the spectral efficiency
or throughput to the transmit power as follows:
ln
Throughput
Transmit Power
= ln(Throughput)− ln(Transmit Power),
where ln(Throughput) becomes the reward function and
ln(Transmit Power) becomes the cost function in (1).
The two-person NOMA-ALOHA game has a strategic
form of triplet: 1) K = {1, 2}, where K represents the set
of users or players; 2) Sk = S, where Sk denotes the set
of strategies of user k; 3) the payoff functions in (1). That
is, the two-person NOMA-ALOHA game is given by G =
{K, {Sk}
K
k=1, {uk}
K
k=1} with K = 2. The resulting game is
symmetric, that is, both players have the same set of strategies,
and their payoff functions satisfy u1(s1, s2) = u2(s2, s1) for
each s1, s2 ∈ S [21]. Furthermore, its bimatrix can be found
as in Table I.
TABLE I
BIMATRIX OF TWO-PERSON NOMA-ALOHA GAME.
H L 0
H (−2,−2) (W − 2,W − 1) (W − 2, 0)
L (W − 1,W − 2) (−1,−1) (W − 1, 0)
0 (0,W − 2) (0,W − 1) (0, 0)
It is noteworthy that the two-person NOMA-ALOHA game
can be seen as a generalization of a multiple access game in
[22] with the notion of NOMA [10]. The multiple access game
in [22] has two strategies for each user: Transmit (T) and Quite
(Q). Strategy T is further divided into H and L in the two-
person NOMA-ALOHA game, while strategy Q becomes 0.
B. Finding NEs
In this subsection, we find NEs of the two-person NOMA-
ALOHA game and show that the NEs depend on the reward
of transmission, W .
IfW ≤ 2, there exist pure strategy NEs [19], [23], denoted
by {s∗k}, which are characterized by
uk(s
∗
k, s
∗
−k) ≥ uk(sk, s
∗
−k) for all sk ∈ Sk, k ∈ K.
For example, for 0 ≤ W < 1, from Table I, we can see that
(s1, s2) = (0, 0) is the pure strategy NE. That is, if the reward
of successful transmission,W , is sufficiently small (compared
to the cost of transmissions), the users do not want to transmit
signals and non-transmission strategy (i.e., sk = 0) becomes
NE. For 1 ≤ W ≤ 2, the pure strategy NEs are (s1, s2) =
(0, L) and (s1, s2) = (L, 0). If W > 2, there is no pure
strategy NE.
In general, we are interested in mixed strategy NEs as
randomized strategy can be well employed for random access.
In order to find the mixed strategy NEs, the principle of
indifference [19] can be used. Since the two-person NOMA-
ALOHA game is symmetric, it suffices to find one user’s
mixed strategy NE. To this end, let a and b denote the
probabilities to choose H and L, respectively. Thus, a mixed
strategy is represented by σ = (a, b, 1−a−b), where a+b ≤ 1.
For convenience, let B denote the payoff matrix for the
row user in Table I. Let [B]n,m = Bn,m. According to the
principle of indifference, the row user has the same expected
payoff for any pure strategy when the column user employs
the mixed strategy NE. Thus, it follows
U = a∗B1,1 + b
∗B1,2 + (1− a
∗ − b∗)B1,3
= a∗B2,1 + b
∗B2,2 + (1− a
∗ − b∗)B2,3
= a∗B3,1 + b
∗B3,2 + (1− a
∗ − b∗)B3,3, (3)
where U is the expected payoff of the row user and (p∗, q∗, 1−
p∗− q∗) is the mixed strategy NE. From (3), we can have two
equations for two unknown variables, a∗ and b∗. In addition,
since a∗ + b∗ ≤ 1, we can find a∗ and b∗.
Noting that B3,i = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 (as the row user
does not transmit) from Table I, we can see that U = 0 if
1 − (a∗ + b∗) > 0 (i.e., the probability of non-transmission
or strategy 0 is greater than 0). In this case, we can have
closed-form expressions for a∗ and b∗ from (3) as follows:
a∗ =
W − 2
W
and b∗ =
W − 1
W
. (4)
The above solution is valid when 2 ≤W < 3 since a∗, b∗ ≥ 0
and 1 − (a∗ + b∗) > 0 are required. If W = 3, we can see
that a∗ + b∗ = 1, which means that the probability of non-
transmission is 0. That is, strategy 0 is not used if the reward
of successful transmission, W , is sufficiently large. Thus, for
W ≥ 3, (3) is reduced to
U = a∗B1,1 + b
∗B1,2 + (1− a
∗ − b∗)B1,3
= a∗B2,1 + b
∗B2,2 + (1− a
∗ − b∗)B2,3. (5)
Then, after some manipulations, we have
a∗ =
W − 1
2W
and b∗ =
W + 1
2W
, W ≥ 3. (6)
We now consider the case that W < 2. If W < 2, the
reward of successful transmission is so small that high-power
transmission is not desirable. Thus, a∗ = 0 (which is the case
that W = 2 as shown in (4)). Thus, (3) is reduced to
U = b∗B2,2 + (1− b
∗)B2,3 = 0, (7)
which leads to
b∗ =
{
W−1
W
, 1 ≤W ≤ 2
0, 0 ≤W < 1.
(8)
In Fig. 1, we show the mixed strategy NE, σ∗ =
(a∗, b∗, 1 − a∗ − b∗), for different values of the reward of
successful transmission, W . As shown in Fig. 1, we can see
that the probability of strategy L is higher than the probability
of strategy H as strategy H has a higher cost than strategy
L. In addition, as W increases, the probability of strategy 0
decreases. That is, as the reward of successful transmission
increases, the users tend to transmit signals. Note that as
W → ∞, a∗ = b∗ → 1
2
from (6), i.e., the users always
transmit.
When users always transmit in conventional ALOHA,
there are collisions with probability (w.p.) 1 and the throughput
(i.e., the average number of successfully transmitted packets)
becomes 0. However, in NOMA-ALOHA, the throughput
does not approach 0 although collisions happen thanks to
NOMA. In the two-person NOMA-ALOHA, as W → ∞,
the asymptotic throughput approaches 1, because the BS is
able to recover the two users’ signals simultaneously as long
as (s1, s2) = (H,L) or (L,H), i.e.,
Throughput = 2× Pr ((s1, s2) = (H,L) or (L,H))
= 2×
1
2
= 1, W →∞.
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Fig. 1. The mixed strategy NE, σ∗ = (a∗, b∗, 1 − a∗ − b∗), for different
values of the reward of successful transmission, W .
C. Average Payoff Maximization
In this subsection, we consider a different approach that is
not based on noncooperative game.
Suppose that a mixed strategy is used and the two users
have the same mixed strategy, σ = (a, b, 1−a− b), and use it
independently (as no cooperation is assumed). From (1), for
a given mixed strategy, the average payoff is given by
u¯(a, b) = E[u(s1, s2)]
= E[R(s1, s2)]− E[C(s1)]
= W (a(1− a) + b(1− b))− 2a− b. (9)
Since u¯(a, b) is concave in a and b, the maximization of the
average payoff can be carried out. In Fig. 2, we show the
optimal mixed strategy, denoted by σˆ = (aˆ, bˆ, 1− aˆ− bˆ) that
maximizes the average payoff for different values of the reward
of successful transmission, W . We can see that the optimal
mixed strategy that maximizes the average payoff is similar
to the mixed strategy NEs in Fig. 1, although both the mixed
strategies are not the same for W ≥ 1. For example, for 0 ≤
W ≤ 1, the probability of strategy 0 is 1 in both the mixed
strategies. In addition, we see that the probability of strategy
L is higher than or equal to that of strategy H , while the
two probabilities approaches 1
2
as W →∞ in both the mixed
strategies.
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Fig. 2. The mixed strategy that maximizes the average payoff for different
values of the reward of successful transmission, W .
Fig. 3 shows the average payoff functions of the two mixed
strategies, σˆ and σ∗, for different values of W . Clearly, σˆ
provides the highest average payoff and higher than that of
σ∗. However, since σˆ is not a mixed strategy NE, any user
who uses a slightly different mixed strategy from σˆ can have
a higher average payoff at the cost of the degraded average
payoff of the other user who uses σˆ.
The ratio of the payoff with σˆ to that with σ∗ can be seen
as a price of anarchy (PoA) [24], [25]. If both the users trust
each other, they can employ σˆ. On the other hand, if there is
no trust, each user may need to employ σ∗, which is NE, and
has a worse average payoff than that can be obtained with σˆ,
i.e., the PoA is less than 1. However, as W → ∞, from (9),
we can see that aˆ and bˆ become 1
2
, which is the same as the
asymptotic mixed strategy NE, (a∗, b∗), with W → ∞, and
the PoA approaches 1.
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Fig. 3. The maximum average payoff and the average payoff of the mixed
strategy NE of the two-person NOMA-ALOHA for different values of W .
III. MULTI-USER NOMA-ALOHA GAME
In this section, we generalize the two-person NOMA-
ALOHA game that was introduced in Section II with more
users.
Suppose that there are K ≥ 2 users. Since each user
has the same payoff function, the NOMA-ALOHA game
is symmetric and the principle of indifference [19] can be
employed in order to find the mixed strategy NE.
For convenience, let the user of interest is user k. Denote
by U(H), U(L), and U(0) the payoff values of user 1 if user
1 chooses sk = H , L, and 0, respectively, when the other
users have the same mixed strategy, (a, b, 1−a−b). Let qk(s)
be the probability that the other users do not employ strategy
s. Since each user chooses a strategy independently, we have
qk(H) =
∏
i6=k
(1− a) = (1− a)
K−1
qk(L) =
∏
i6=k
(1− b) = (1− b)
K−1
. (10)
From this, we show that
U(H) = −C(H) (1− qk(H)) + (W − C(H))qk(H)
U(L) = (W − C(L))qk(L)− C(L) (1− qk(L)) , (11)
while the payoff of user k becomes U(0) = 0 when sk = 0.
Like the analysis in Section II, we can see that if W < 1,
both the probabilities of strategies H and L are to be 0 for
NE. Thus, (a∗, b∗, 1 − a∗ − b∗) = (0, 0, 1). For 1 ≤ W < 2,
strategy H cannot be applied for the mixed strategy NE (i.e.,
a∗ = 0). In this case, since we need to have
U(L) = U(0),
the resulting mixed strategy NE becomes
(a∗, b∗, 1− a∗ − b∗) =
(
0, 1−
(
1
W
) 1
K−1
,
(
1
W
) 1
K−1
)
.
The mixed strategy NE for W ≥ 2 can be shown as follows.
Lemma 1. Let
W ∗ =
(
1 + 2
1
K−1
)K−1
. (12)
For 2 ≤W < W ∗, we have
(a∗, b∗) =
(
1−
(
1−
2
W
) 1
K−1
, 1−
(
1
W
) 1
K−1
)
. (13)
For W ≥W ∗, b∗ is the solution of
WbK−1 =W (1 − b)K−1 + 1, (14)
while a∗ = 1− b∗.
Proof: Suppose that the probability that a user employs
strategy 0 is not zero, while a, b > 0. Then, by the principle
of indifference, we need to have U(H) = U(L) = U(0) = 0.
From (11), it can be shown that
Wqk(H)− 2 =Wqk(L)− 1 = 0.
Thus, we have
a∗ = 1−
(
2
W
) 1
K−1
and b∗ = 1−
(
1
W
) 1
K−1
, (15)
which is given in (13).
However, if W is sufficiently large (i.e., for a sufficiently
large reward of successful transmission), the probability that
a user employs strategy 0 becomes zero or a∗ + b∗ = 1. The
corresponding W is the solution of 1 = a∗ + b∗ or
1 =
(
2
W
) 1
K−1
+
(
1
W
) 1
K−1
, (16)
which is W ∗ in (12). In this case (i.e., W ≥ W ∗), we only
need to have U(H) = U(L) with a∗+ b∗ = 1. Thus, we have
Wqk(H)− 2 = Wqk(L)− 1 and a
∗ + b∗ = 1,
which can also be expressed as (14) in terms of b only. Clearly,
the solution of (14) is b∗, and a∗ becomes 1 − b∗, which
completes the proof.
Fig. 4 shows the mixed strategy NE, σ∗ = (a∗, b∗, 1 −
a∗ − b∗), for different values of the reward of successful
transmission, W , when K = 5 with W ∗ = 22.969. Note
that W ∗ = 3 when K = 2 according to (12), and W ∗ can
be seen as the threshold value of the reward of successful
transmission to set the probability of sk = 0 to 0. Clearly,
from (12), W ∗ increases with K . That is, a higher reward
of successful transmission is required to force users to keep
transmitting as K increases.
Fig. 5 shows the mixed strategy NE, σ∗ = (a∗, b∗, 1 −
a∗ − b∗), for different numbers of users when W = 10.
For a fixed reward of successful transmissions, as the number
of users increases, the probability of transmissions (either H
or L) decreases, while the probability of non-transmissions
increases. This behavior results from the increase of the
probability of collision as K increases.
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Fig. 4. The mixed strategy NE, σ∗ = (a∗, b∗, 1 − a∗ − b∗), for different
values of the reward of successful transmission, W , when K = 5.
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Fig. 5. The mixed strategy NE, σ∗ = (a∗, b∗, 1 − a∗ − b∗), for different
numbers of users when W = 10.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we formulated a multiple access game
for ALOHA with (power-domain) NOMA, where the payoff
function is based on energy efficiency. The mixed strategy NE
has been derived using the principle of indifference to decide
transmission parameters, i.e., the probability of transmissions.
It was shown that the probability of transmissions can ap-
proach 1 as the reward of successful transmission increases.
In this case, unlike conventional ALOHA, we showed that
the throughput does not approach 0, although there is packet
collision because the power levels of users can be different
thanks to NOMA.
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